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ABSTRACT: In argumentation studies, almost all theoretical proposals are applied, in general, to the
analysis and evaluation of written argumentative texts. I will consider mathematics to illustrate some
differences between argumentative practice and the products of it, to emphasize the need to address
the different types of argumentative discourse and argumentative situation. Argumentative practice
should be encouraged when teaching technical subjects to convey a better understanding and to
improve thought and creativity.
KEYWORDS: Argument, Argumentation, Mathematical Practice, Learning, Proof

1. INTRODUCTION
Since Aristotle, logic has been considered a normative theory of reasoning and as
such has been applied to the analysis and evaluation of arguments. In the last
century, Toulmin (1958) noticed a gap between logic as a theory of argument and
real practice; his work gave rise to new ways of conceiving and theorizing about
arguments. The study of fallacies was pivotal in the development of the field of
argumentation and emphasis on avoiding fallacious arguments when arguing in
natural settings was the driving force behind the new theoretical proposals. In part
because of these origins, almost all theoretical proposals in the field of
argumentation apply to the analysis and evaluation of arguments, mostly in written
texts.
Johnson (2000) states that a theory of argumentation, considered as a theory
of the practice of argumentation, has to consider many aspects not included in the
study of its products. He defines argumentation as “the socio-cultural activity of
constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing and revising arguments” (p. 12).
For Johnson, a theory of argument is a component of a theory of argumentation and
he considers that proper work has to be done first towards a better theory of
argument in order to have a balanced theory of argumentation.
Much work has been done to present actual examples of arguments as they
appear in real practice but, nevertheless, it is still true that, as Hitchcock (2002, p.
288) remarks of Johnson’s examples of argumentative interchanges, “[they] do not
exhibit at first glance the features of one person interpreting and criticizing an
argument and the argument’s author revising it in response to this criticism”,
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-14.

BEGOÑA CARRASCAL
features he considers constitutive of the practice of argumentation.
The relationship between the theory and practice of argumentation has been
reconsidered again in several recent papers, for example, those by Pinto (2001),
Johnson (2005) and Kvernbekk (2012). The positions of the authors differ, but,
when talking of practice, they usually consider specific arguments as they appear in
argumentative exchanges in order to analyze the distance a normative theory of
argument should maintain to be of any value to evaluate practice. In general, they
want to assess the arguments as part of the activity, but not the activity as a whole.
The ideal pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is “based on
analytical considerations regarding the most pertinent presentation of the
constitutive parts of a problem-valid procedure for carrying out a particular kind of
discursive task” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005, p. 75). The emphasis is put in the
activity, but here too, its application is devoted to the analysis and evaluation of the
argumentative products. This is the case even in the latest attempts to look at the
properties of what the above cited authors call activity types, defined as
“conventionalized entities that can be distinguished by ‘external’ empirical
observation of the communicative practices in the various domains […] of
discourse” (p. 76).
In this paper, I consider some issues of recent papers associated with
mathematical argumentation in an attempt to contribute to the discussion about the
role of arguing in mathematical practice and in the evaluation of the products of this
practice. I argue that, in mathematical practice, argumentation considered as a
rational, social and communicative activity should be encouraged to improve
collaborative, efficient and creative work, but this does not necessarily imply that
direct application of the current theories of ordinary argumentation to evaluate its
products should be undertaken. The particular constraints of mathematical
activities, for example, the rigor required for mathematical definitions and proofs
and their institutionalized forms, are sufficient for their evaluation in the different
contexts in which they arise.
Application of problem-solving strategies has proved helpful for the
successful accomplishment of mathematical tasks and the understanding of difficult
mathematical concepts. In those cases, argumentation may be of help not only to
raise and solve problems, formulate hypotheses, ask for justification of inferential
steps, construct explanations and test one’s understanding, but also to establish
relationships between concepts and the application of methods in different
situations. That is, argumentation may be of help if mathematics is considered as a
critical and collaborative inquiry to look for a solution to a problem. Nevertheless,
adaptation to the specific activity type and the actual context may have to be taken
into account to design the tasks and argumentative practices that trigger
collaborative and effective work.
2. A LOOK AT PROOFS, ARGUMENTS AND MATHEMATICAL PRACTICE
Discussion on the nature of mathematical proof has a long history that is beyond the
scope of this paper. I refer only to some recent contributions that link the idea of
proof, argument and the kind of processes that can be found in different contexts of
2
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mathematical practice in order to support my claim that argumentative practice is
important to promote understanding, and to improve thought and creativity,
including in mathematics.
Johnson (2000, p. 168) defines argument as “the distillate of the practice of
argumentation”. For him, in addition to the reasons to support a claim (the illative
core of the argument), “an argument possesses a dialectical tier in which the arguer
discharges his dialectical obligations”. As he considers that mathematical proofs do
not have this “dialectical tier”, they are not (paradigmatic) arguments. As Tindale
(2002) points out, “this concept of argument is hampered by an internal tension
between the product an argument is and the process it captures” (p. 299) because
mathematical proofs appear in many types of argumentative situation and the idea
that mathematical proofs are more than chains of deductive inferences is nowadays
supported in very different fields or disciplines.
From the field of argumentation, Aberdein (2009) presents an insightful
recompilation of references in which authors appeal directly to studies on
mathematical proof and mathematical practice. In this paper and in many others
(see references), Aberdein considers that much of what mathematicians do, in
particular proofs, may be understood as a “species of argument”, considering it “an
act of communication intended to lend support to a claim” (p. 1-2). Several authors
(for example, Alcolea Banegas, 1998; Aberdein, 2010; Dove, 2009) consider that the
way mathematicians analyze and assess mathematical reasoning is closer to the way
informal logicians analyze and assess ordinary arguments than what the convention
about mathematical proof asserts, namely, that the reconstruction of a mathematical
proof should conform to a chain of valid deductive arguments. As a consequence,
they think that elements of the new theories of argument(ation) may be of help to
assess mathematical proofs as given in practice. Krabbe (2008) distinguishes
different types of mathematical activity with various objectives and examines
examples of strategic maneuvering in mathematical proofs.
From the field of the philosophy of mathematics, Pólya and Lakatos’s
pioneering work to present proofs based on their own heuristic experience did not
resonate with the mainstream of the discipline, except perhaps for the application of
their proposals to mathematical education. The deductivist and logicistic
approaches to science in general, and to mathematics in particular, were the
conventional approaches during the majority of the last century. The emphasis on
the objects or results promoted losing sight of the processes by which they were
obtained (Ferreirós, 2010). Nowadays, there is a widespread eagerness to overcome
the foundational view on mathematics that considers mathematical theorems a
priori truths that are there, in the void, waiting to be discovered. Instead, there is a
new emphasis to understand how proofs are developed and built and many
philosophers of mathematics are now concerned with the kinds of activities
mathematicians perform, that is, how the practice of mathematics is actually carried
out (Mancosu, 2008). There is a turn to the practical (Gabbay & Woods, 2005) and
the dividing line between the pair product/process, the first conceived as an object
of analysis subject to a normative evaluation, and the second seeking to
accommodate the descriptive adequacy of real practices, has begun to blur.
Aberdein (2011) provides us again with a good summary of references of works that
3
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try to integrate insights from many fields into a new philosophy of mathematical
practice.
In traditional mathematics education, mathematics consists of readymade
perfect products transmitted directly by the teacher in an authoritative but also
authoritarian way. All is set up to be accepted. The process of discovery or of
construction that led to these products is hardly considered. Communication is
oriented mainly to the explanation of difficult steps in proofs, the resolution of
repetitive problems as applications of the theory and the assessment of the
solutions. Argumentation (in the ordinary sense of the term) among students or
with the teacher is not usual. The focus is on knowing that something is the case, not
on how it can be constructed. This fact can be explained in part by the difficulty that
many students encounter to assimilate abstract concepts and by the need to address
very long curricula. At elementary levels, a constructivist approach to mathematics
is nowadays more common, but as soon as the contents of the curriculum
accumulate, the traditional way of doing mathematics is still prevalent in many
countries. As a consequence, many students give up on understanding mathematics
and apply the results or methods in a mechanical and rote way. If we think of
education as a way of pursuing a method to construct knowledge in the mind of the
student, the classical approach to mathematics is clearly not the ideal.
If we look at the practice of mathematics in any particular setting, we soon
realize that, to establish the right path of valid inferences that lead to the solution of
a problem, we first have to perform many different activities. For example, we have
to conceptualize the new ideas that can be of help to solve the problem and to do so,
we have, maybe, to translate it into another more familiar domain. We also have to
find a proof strategy able to solve the problem and, to arrive at that, we have to
identify a promising direction to find the solution and/or to dismiss other
directions. We may have to explain to ourselves or to others the reasons to adopt or
to reject this strategy, that is, to explain why we think this direction is appropriate
or why it will not work. We have to confirm that the strategy works by being able to
express the particular details that conform to it; to do so, we may have to express
those technical or difficult details that lead to the solution to make it
comprehensible to others and, at the same time, we may have to eliminate those
details that at first seemed to be necessary, but that finally are not. In addition, we
may have to go back to the first formulation of the problem to readdress its initial
conditions by including additional preconditions to accommodate the solution
found. We may also look for ways to adapt the problem and its solution to an actual
problem in a specific field. We may want to refine the proof to make it clearer or
more elegant. Finally, we may have to communicate the problem and its solution to
different audiences.
The ideas involved in these tasks are in many cases tentative, incomplete or
even incorrect and have to be developed or explained in order to be included in the
final presentation of the solution or in the proof of the theorem. Not all this material
is included in the final product, but all of this is part of the mathematical practice
that leads to the solution. Those intermediate steps towards the solution are
important to understand how mathematics works.
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If we think of practice in mathematics as a set of complex activities and tasks
to be performed in order to solve a mathematical problem, not only logical
reasoning but also good arguing is a very valuable tool to improve understanding
and creativity, as I try to show in the following sections.
3. MATHEMATICS AND ARGUMENTATION
The influence of Johnson’s definition of argument and the reaction to it from some of
the researchers coming from the field of mathematical argumentation can be easily
seen in many of the papers cited in the last section. For example, Dove (2009)
presents many mathematical examples to try to show that the method by which
mathematicians assess mathematical reasoning resembles the practice of informal
logic or argumentation theory. Alcolea Banegas (1998), Aberdein (2005) and many
others (see Aberdein, 2009 for references) try to adapt Toulmin’s layout to
mathematics. Aberdein (2010) and Dove (2009) consider how some of the
argumentation schemes in the work of Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008) may be of
use to evaluate mathematics. Epstein (2012) proposes an account of mathematical
reasoning by means of two parallel structures: an inferential structure of formal
derivations and an argumentation structure by which mathematicians attempt to
convince each other. Aberdein (2012), following this proposal, discusses theoretical
conceptions of mathematical practice by analyzing the nature of steps that should be
admitted to the argumentational structure in a mathematical proof.
In many of these papers, the main concern is to show that there is
argumentation in mathematics. To do so, the authors often discuss examples of
problems, proofs or different kinds of mathematical error, either to show how
mathematicians evaluate them in practice or to show that the way in which the neat
final results were reached was by refining previous faulty results, using to that end
ordinary communicative forms in a language that was not totally formalized. Either
way, the authors justify, can have a parallel in ordinary theories of argumentation.
To give an example, Dove (2009, pp. 140-141) comments on one of the faulty
proofs in the work of Maxwell (1959) in which the proposed task is to prove that any
given triangle is isosceles1.
First of all, maybe there could be someone, somewhere, who considers this a
true problem and is trying to find a proof for it, but it is difficult to imagine such a
situation. Moreover, the proposed proof begins with a diagram of a triangle that
clearly is not isosceles. After that, a very detailed notation is used; there is an appeal
to two mathematical theorems (the angle bisection theorem and the sine rule) and a
series of careful mathematical steps are given. That is, the method used is
mathematical. Then, the supposed author of the proof makes the error of
considering that, from the equality of sines, the equality of angles follows.
The error is trickier to find in the original example because of many of the
factors already cited (use of graphics, notational details, the appeal to mathematical

Examples from Maxwell can also be found in Aberdein (2010). A very similar example to this one
from Wikipedia can be found in Krabbe (2008).
1
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theorems, etc.). Dove uses this example to illustrate how people proceed when
confronted with an evidently faulty result and to defend that “the process one uses
to discover the mistake is analogous to the process one might use to criticize an
unpalatable argument in non-mathematical settings” (p. 6). Nevertheless, in my
opinion, the example lacks a real context. For example, in a classroom setting, a
teacher would not need much time to discover the error. It is a common error made
time and again by students of elementary trigonometry. What is not typical of a
classroom context is the careful notation, the use of two theorems and the attentive
and mathematical style of the proof. All of this makes natural for many to attempt to
find a more sophisticated kind of error. I think that, in order to learn more about the
nature of mathematical practice and how its products are evaluated, we should be
looking at real examples of this practice, including the contextual elements of the
situations in which they were produced.
Other lines of defense on the argumentative nature of mathematics are the
appeal to the axiom of choice (Dove, 2009; Alcolea Banegas, 1998, among others),
the surveyability of long proofs (Coleman, 2009) or even the use of mathematical
diagrams (Larvor, 2012). All of them try to underline the “challengeable” nature of
at least some mathematical proofs and to defend the idea that some results can be
accepted not only because of their validity, but also because they are useful for
mathematics. This being true, it is also true that many proofs in mathematics are
deductive. In my opinion, there is no need to appeal to special cases to defend the
assertion that, in mathematical practice, there is a place for argumentation. We only
have to distinguish between mathematical products and mathematical practice. As
Kuhn (1992) states, thinking as argument “arises every time a significant decision
must be made” (p. 157).
Pólya (1945, 1954) and Lakatos (1976) are cited in every work that tries to
emphasize the plausible and heuristic nature of mathematical practice but, then,
examples tend to show the argument in the products instead of the practice. As
noticed by many authors, mathematical practice is not always successful and in
many cases it creates “knowledge” that is neither precise, rigorous nor certain
(Chazan, 1990). It is, I think, in this process that argumentation has a natural place.
From a review of many of the papers cited above we can extract two main
ideas. First, Johnson’s influential definition placed a burden on many of their
authors to justify the claim that mathematical products are argumentative. Second,
there is a manifest tension in these works between the examples of mathematical
products considered as arguments and the process that leads to them.
At first glance, Krabbe (2008) seems to avoid this problem because he takes
note of the “various contexts in which proofs occur and of the various objectives
they may serve” (p. 453). He also proposes a list of contexts of proof and the
supposed functions of reasoning in them by their association to different types of
dialogue:
1.
2.

thinking up a proof to convince oneself of the truth of some theorem;
thinking up a proof in dialogue with other people (inquiry dialogue; probative
functions of reasoning);
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3.
4.
5.

presenting a proof to one’s fellow discussants in an inquiry dialogue
(persuasion dialogue embedded in inquiry dialogue; persuasive and probative
functions of reasoning);
presenting a proof to other mathematicians, e.g. by publishing it in a journal
(persuasion dialogue; persuasive and probative functions of reasoning);
presenting a proof when teaching (information-seeking and persuasion
dialogue; explanatory, persuasive, and probative functions of reasoning)
(Krabbe, 2008, p. 457).

The first two types of activity are not considered argumentative owing to the
characteristics associated by Walton & Krabbe (1995) with the type of dialog in
which they occur. For Krabbe, probative functions are intended to extend
knowledge and are not argumentative. In order to have persuasive functions, the
aim should be to convince another by overcoming her doubts (p. 457).
Nevertheless, it is in the situation of thinking up a proof or of looking for the
solution to a problem that there is doubt and dialectic situations can appear (clearly
with respect to others, but even with respect to oneself). When trying to establish
the inferential structure that glues together the initial conditions and the solution or
the claim, there are many situations in which a choice has to be made in conditions
of uncertainty. There may be many methods to try that could be of use. You may
need to persuade the other (or yourself) that a particular path of inquiry is better
that another or that some conjecture is adequate to solve a problem. There may also
be situations in which, although the inference seems valid, you may ask yourself or
other people to look for possible counterexamples to the claim. There may be cases
in which the solution to a problem is already known, but, nevertheless, you may
want to try it with specific examples before thinking up how to prove it, and so on.
Another difference between the first two situations and the other three in the
list that could, maybe, be invoked is that, when thinking up a proof, there is no need
for language interaction. Language is an important tool for thinking in mathematics
(Thurston, 1994). The need to formulate careful definitions and the use of specific
notation seem fundamental to advance in the construction of a proof. Thinking up a
proof with other people without linguistic interaction seems impossible and, if
communication is needed, it is difficult to distinguish this case from that of a
presentation of a proof to other people (case 4) except for the fact that, here, there is
doubt involved and dialectical and rhetorical elements have, in my opinion, a role to
play.
The two first activities in the list are just those that correspond to the
discovery process in mathematics (Lakatos, 1976) or in rhetorical terms to the
inventio part before the deliverance of a speech or the production of a written text.
In those situations, the dialog types are always complex. It could be of use to
separate the five types of activity for theoretical purposes, but at least the first two
appear in general to be mixed up with one of the others.
A problem is always proposed or considered in a specific contextual situation
(be it a classroom context, an academic situation or even a proposal to solve a
problem through the internet) and, although the solution to it may be unique, if we
consider the definition of argumentation given by van Eemeren et al. (1996) that
considers argumentation as a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at
7
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increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a standpoint, the activity of looking
up for a solution stands in accordance with this definition.
Krabbe considers the dialectical component of a proof to lie in the number of
inferential steps it contains. However, I think that inferential steps correspond to
the logical part of the proof and dialectical components correspond to the
communicative situations in which mathematical practice is undertaken. All the
situations in the list are communicative events in which an audience is involved (in
the first one, only oneself). When communicating mathematical work, abstract
notation, uses of previous works and deductive inferences are always involved. In
those cases, explanation of some inferential steps or definitions may be needed to
enhance understanding and to accept the proof. As Mancosu (2011) states, demands
for explanation in proofs do not always come with a new proof, but they may
contribute to reinforce it, so I consider that they have their place in the dialectical
tier of the argumentative exchange.
Besides, there could be some (easy) cases where persuasion (or conviction)
could be reached only by understanding the inferential process in the proof. In those
cases, when presenting the proof to others, rhetorical and communicational
elements would surely be present, but not necessarily dialectical moves.
To finish with, I think that what is behind this list is the necessity of a final
proof to assign persuasive functions to a mathematical situation. There is again the
tension between the practice and the products of this practice. There is also the
legacy of the deductivist approach to mathematics and, perhaps, the added difficulty
of observing practice in different real situations.
Much more work is needed to observe and understand the relationship
between actual mathematical practices and argumentation in different contexts in
order to design protocols that can help in the development of a better
understanding of, and to improve thought and creativity in, mathematics. Empirical
research from the field of mathematical education could be of help to understand
better how mathematics and argumentation are handled in the classroom. The
analysis of Pease & Martin (2012) of the third Mini-Polymath project (Tao, 2011),
involving online collaborative work to solve a mathematical problem, also
represents a good step to explore another type of context. Finally, it is worth
considering the first exploration of van Bendengem & van Kerkhove (2009) to
situate mathematical arguments in context, by looking at their commentaries on the
organization of a large research program to prove a difficult theorem and on the
mode of presentation of a paper by Pólya.
4. ARGUING, PROVING AND LEARNING IN MATHEMATICS
Learning has traditionally been defined as the integration of new information with
existing knowledge (Andriessen, 2009). However, a learner’s previous knowledge
can inhibit the integration of new information because this knowledge may have
proved efficient in different situations in the past (Balacheff, 2010). A good way to
overcome this problem is by argumentation.
Mathematical ideas may not be a matter of opinion or belief, but arguing is
important as a type of communication to fix a (shared) understanding of
8
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mathematical concepts, to improve inferential steps and to question the solution to
a problem. Although some researchers in mathematical education consider that “the
key role of proof is the promotion of mathematical understanding” (Hanna, 2000, p.
5), a more careful look at what those authors mean by proof shows that, for them
too, it means much more than mere syntax or a chain of valid deductive steps and
includes ordinary argumentative elements to promote understanding.
Schwarz (2009) presents an outline of the complex relationships between
argumentation and learning. To begin with, there are different approaches to the
definition of what constitutes learning and each conception determines the role of
the argumentation in the classroom.
For some psychologists, learning is a psychological change in the individual
that can be observed indirectly between successive activities. For others, learning
emerges through interactions. These two views may not be incompatible, but they
have been considered as if they were so from a theoretical point of view and they
can be representative of the way mathematical education has been undertaken
throughout history.
While the traditional view maintains that the acquisition of mathematical
skills is individually undertaken, a more accurate view considers that the interaction
with peers and a teacher is essential. When adopting the second view, many
researchers think that the role of argumentation is central, even in mathematics
(Muller Mirza & Perret-Cremont, 2009). Nevertheless, the relationship between
argumentation and learning in mathematics is complex because, in learning, there
are multiple processes involved and different forms of undertaking them.
One of the processes involved in mathematical learning is the
conceptualization of mathematical ideas. Empirical research proves that
argumentation may represent an important tool to intervene in the progressive
construction of basic mathematical concepts and in the development of
consciousness and systematic links when it is guided by careful mediation of the
teacher and a good design of the task, which has to take into account the
appropriateness of it with respect to the class (Douek & Scali, 2000). As these
authors have shown for elementary education, the relationship between doubt and
communication through argumentation can serve as the basis to encourage
questioning, expression and evolution of conceptualization in mathematics.
Another process in mathematical education is the acquisition of reasoning
skills. Several researchers have stressed the psychological gap that separates
arguing and proving in the classroom (Schwarz, 2009). In many cases, the
presentation of a proof is not persuasive enough to convince a student of its validity
(Duval, 1991; Healy & Hoyles, 2000). Argumentative dialogs between students
and/or with the teacher may help to bridge this gap because proofs are then
conceived as constructions built up through an interactive process that looks for the
understanding and the acknowledgment of the student who has to explain all the
steps of the inferential process. Nevertheless, careful guidance of the process may be
needed to transform spontaneous or even authoritarian interchanges into
argumentative situations that are of help to understand it (Atzmon, Hershkowitz &
Schwarz, 2006).

9
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The educational system does not facilitate the development of good
argumentative practices in higher levels of education. The pressure to cover all the
material leaves insufficient time for arguing in mathematics classes and thus
students merely assume the value of proof in mathematics, even if they do not fully
understand how it works. They assume that the lack of understanding is due to a
lack of knowledge. Discussion to promote understanding is not common in
mathematics classes in higher education. As soon as the curriculum becomes more
advanced, this lack of understanding presents an obstacle to many students and the
gap between the application of the theory and the practical work they need to do to
solve problems may widen. Repetition of techniques is a typical way to acquire
mathematical knowledge. As a consequence, many students do not fully understand
what they are doing and fail when a different kind of problem is proposed or
integration of different concepts is needed.
Argumentative dialogs can be used to attain different goals depending on the
context in which they arise. For example, a mathematical problem in the classroom
can be presented as a kind of collaborative task in which two or more parties work
together to resolve it. Another goal of an argumentative dialog can be that of
developing competences related to critical reasoning. However, how could we relate
that to mathematics? For instance, a way of promoting mathematical understanding
and avoiding mistakes could be to look at the different solutions proposed to solve a
task in order to compare, to relate and to evaluate them. A simple first-order
equation can be solved, for instance, by algebraic or by geometric means. The
solution may be unique, but comparison of methods may help to improve the critical
assessment of mathematical methods.
To sum up, in order to achieve good cognitive development, it is important
that the student learns to argue, but also that she argues to learn in different
contexts with different goals (Andriessen, Baker & Suthers, 2003).
Nevertheless, not all the dialogical attempts to use argumentation as a
collaborative method to solve a problem and to improve understanding are
successful (Andriessen, 2009). As empirical research shows (Douek, 2005),
mediation by an instructor may be needed to trigger productive argumentative
practices. For example, it could be necessary to question statements that are not
really helpful in understanding a problem, to integrate discussions or arguments
provided by different students, and to generate and integrate new statements,
among others. As a consequence, it is important that teachers have pedagogical and
theoretical skills to foster argumentation in the classroom. Moreover, the activities
need to be well designed and the implementation of a good design for an
argumentative mathematical task may need to include some of the sociological
characteristics of the group for which the task is designed. Only in this way can
argumentation serve as a tool to promote understanding, to reinforce reasoning
skills and as an efficient method to achieve good results in mathematics.
The discovery part of a proof is possibly the most difficult phase of any
mathematical work. As Kerber & Pollet (2007, p. 87) state, deduction systems may
be suitable as proof checkers in many cases, but lack the capacity to act as proof
assistants for the exploration and construction of new mathematical knowledge.
Argumentation theory and direct observation of real mathematical practice may be
10
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of help to design protocols to facilitate mathematical work, but as Pease & Martin
(2012) remark, we are still a long way from a system that could contribute in a
human-like manner to a mathematical discussion that has the goal of solving a
problem.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have presented several considerations from mathematics to try to
show some of the differences between the product of a practice and the practice
itself that are not reflected by careful analysis and evaluation of its products.
Much of what is done in mathematics is informal in the sense that it is not
done in a pure formal system. In practice, in mathematical proofs, there are gaps
and appeals to intuition (by the use of diagrams, for example), and proofs are not
fully formalized. Controversies occur and are in practice dealt with without fully
formalizing them. However, standards of rigor are specific and additional
requirements of mathematical practice and proofs are always achieved and checked
by the mathematical community according to those standards.
Proofs arise in dialogical contexts (even when thinking up a proof to
convince oneself). Doubt is always present in the period of discovery of a proof or
while looking for the solution to a problem. As a consequence, in the process of
proving, argumentation, as in ordinary contexts, is always present. As Pólya (1954)
stated, “we secure our mathematical knowledge by demonstrative reasoning, but we
support our conjectures by plausible reasoning” (p. vi).
Presentation of mathematical products is a communicative act and, as usual
in such acts, not all the communicational elements are made explicit. In
mathematical proofs, gaps are intentionally left, but those gaps need not correspond
to faulty inferential steps (Fallis, 2003). In many cases, several steps of the
inferential process are left out to facilitate communication and to adapt to the
context. For example, a long proof with all the small inferential steps made explicit
may be boring for working mathematicians. An outline of the proof or of the
problem may be sufficient and more informative than a complete proof in a
classroom or in a scientific meeting. We can express the difference by saying that, in
this case, we are making someone see the proof versus letting someone know the
proof (Vega, 1999).
Rhetorical elements to persuade may and should be part of the process of
communicating a mathematical result, but the dialectical component may or may
not be present. For example, in a presentation of a mathematical result, there can be
(or not) demands for a better explanation of it, and there can be (or not) requests
for a better, clearer or more detailed display of the steps in the proof or some of the
concepts involved in it. The appeal to diagrams, images, analogies or rhetorical
figures can be not only of help but even a must in order to make the result
understandable and, as a consequence, acceptable for the (mathematical) audience.
As a result doubts and even a display of counterexamples or a rebuttal of the proof
can occur, that is, an argumentative dialog may begin, but does not have to.
Mathematical practice is complex and, in many cases, collaborative work can
be helpful to advance towards comprehension and solution of a problem. This is
11
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particularly clear in classroom settings, but it can also be seen in contexts involving
more advanced mathematics. The Mini-Polymath projects are a good example of
collaborative work over the internet to solve difficult conjectures and open
problems in mathematics (Pease & Martin, 2011). When collaboration is
undertaken, argumentation is always present and may help to accomplish many
mathematical tasks that go beyond those of analyzing and evaluating a proof. The
use of argumentative diagrams may also be useful to organize the process towards
the proof. As Pease and Martin state, careful consideration should be given to
mathematical practice in order to design protocols that help in a human-like manner
to improve mathematical thinking. To advance in this direction, more attention
should be paid to the different contexts in which practice is undertaken in order to
look for special requirements that apply in those contexts. Social dimensions of
practice should be considered if we want to construct better ways of arguing and, as
a consequence, of thinking, including in mathematics.
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